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ABSTRACT: Frege writes in Numbers and Arithmetic about kindergarten-numbers and “an a priori mode of cognition” 
that they may have “a geometrical source.” This resembles recent findings on arithmetical cognition. In my pa-
per, I explore this resemblance between Gottlob Frege’s later position concerning the geometrical source of 
arithmetical knowledge, and some current positions in the literature dedicated to arithmetical cognition, es-
pecially that of Stanislas Dehaene. In my analysis, I shall try to mainly see to what extent (Frege’s) logicism is 
compatible with (Dehaene’s) intuitionism.
Keywords: logicism, intuitionism, Frege, Dehaene, arithmetical cognition.
RESUMEN: En Numbers and Arithmetic Frege escribe que kindergarten-numbers y «un modo a priori de cognición» 
pueden tener «un origen geométrico». Esto se asemeja a algunos descubrimientos recientes sobre cognición 
aritmética. En mi artículo, exploro la semejanza entre la útlima posición de Gottlob Frege acerca del origen 
geométrico del conocimiento aritmético, y algunas posiciones actuales en la bibliografía sobre cognición aritmé-
tica, especialmente la de Stanislas Dehaene. En mi análisis, intento principalmente determinar hasta qué punto 
el logicismo (de Frege) es compatible con el intuicionismo (de Dehaene).
Palabras clave: logicismo, intuicionismo, Frege, Dehaene, cognición aritmética.
We commonly think of arithmetic as an abstract and non-spatial domain, populated by 
numbers which are (a kind of) logical objects that are far from possessing any geometri-
cal traits. Moreover, besides those abilities required for the cognitive manipulation of sym-
bols, no spatial processing seems to be implicated in arithmetical cognition. However, at a 
closer analysis of the phenomena involved in mathematical cognition, we may discover that 
spatial and number processing are intimately connected, and thus that geometrical and ar-
ithmetical knowledge share a common epistemic foundation. Hence this paper is part of a 
larger project which tries to reconcile traditional philosophies of mathematics, commonly 
seen as mutually incompatible, and integrate them with contemporary research.
For most of his life, Gottlob Frege held that geometry and arithmetic should be kept 
separate, because they have different epistemic foundations. However, by the end of his life, 
* Versions of this material were presented at two workshops: The Cognitive Basis of Logico-Mathematical 
Knowledge (Bergen, November 2015) and From Basic Cognition to Mathematical Practice (Seville, Sep-
tember 2016). I thank those audiences for their comments and critical feedback, and I also thank two 
anonymous referees for this journal, for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. I 
also thank Sorin Chiper and Alina Tigau for helping me revising this paper.
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he came to the conclusion that the two are intimately connected, and that arithmetic seems 
to have “a geometrical source”, which is both objective and a priori. This claim is substan-
tially supported by recent findings about arithmetical cognition. The main aim of my arti-
cle is to present and analyze this resemblance between Gottlob Frege’s later position con-
cerning the geometrical source of arithmetical knowledge, and some current views in the 
literature dedicated to arithmetical cognition, especially that of Stanislas Dehaene concern-
ing our number sense. My analysis is twofold: first, I will investigate whether Frege’s logicism 
is compatible with Dehaene’s intuitionism and second, I will attempt to see in which sense 
we may argue that arithmetical cognition has a geometrical epistemic basis. Following these 
aims, the paper is structured in four sections: Section 1 gives an overview of Frege’s initial 
logicism; Section 2 presents Dehaene’s intutionism; Section 3 tackles Frege’s later logicism 
or his intu-logicism and finally, Section 4 concludes by briefly discussing the role of geomet-
rical knowledge in arithmetical cognition.
1. Frege’s initial logicism
As is commonly acknowledged, Gottlob Frege’s lifetime project was logicism, yet this 
project was not just logicism per se; for logicism as the formal thesis that arithmetic is (re-
ducible to) logic is compatible with both formalism and psychologism, whereas Frege con-
stantly and explicitly rejects both. For Frege, arithmetical signs have content (contrary to 
formalism) and this content is not subjective (contrary to psychologism). To put it briefly, 
for Frege, the subject matter of arithmetic is contentful, i.e. it is not a mere game with empty 
signs, and its content is objective. This objective content of mathematics is in Frege’s view 
a crucial characteristic of arithmetic, one that explains its universal applicability and lends 
it the status of a general science; thus for him the most dangerous threat to a proper char-
acterization of arithmetic is to consider that it lacks any form of proper content, i.e. to en-
dorse mathematical formalism. Frege’s logicist project, started mainly as an epistemic reac-
tion to both Kant’s intuitionistic position and to the growing formalist trend among his 
contemporary mathematicians, especially that exemplified and defended by his colleagues 
Eduard Heinrich Heine (University of Halle) and Carl Johannes Thomae (University of 
Jena). However, Frege’s logicist project was labeled and received mainly as Platonism, i.e. 
as an ontological position. What is interesting is that at the end of his life, Frege loosened 
his ontological Platonist commitments precisely retaining his initial epistemic stance that 
arithmetic is logic. The change boiled down to the addition of the idea that arithmetic has 
a geometric conceptual foundation, thus making room for “an a priori mode of cognition”, 
fundamental to all mathematical knowledge.
In his On Formal Theories of Arithmetic,12Frege identifies two ways in which arithmetic 
could be seen as ‘formal’. The former way is given by the “logical or formal nature of arith-
metic”, namely the fact that “all arithmetical propositions can be derived from definitions 
alone using purely logical means (…) in direct contrast with geometry.” (Frege 1984, 112)
This could be regarded today as a syntactic characterization of arithmetic as being ‘for-
mal’, and, for Frege, this is the good formalism in mathematics. The main purpose of Frege’s 
1 In Frege (1984).
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begriffsschrift was to facilitate this formal derivation of arithmetical truths from the logical 
ones.2 It is worth mentioning here that Frege sees arithmetic “in direct contrast with geom-
etry.” For him, only arithmetic was regarded as analytic (as reducible to logic), whereas ge-
ometry, given its appeal to the intuition of space, is not, for intuitions are subjective.
The latter way is characterized by Frege as problematic and should consequently be 
vigorously refuted. This is the semantic characterization of arithmetical formalism which 
regards arithmetical symbols as empty or meaningless —“in which case we should have 
neither truths, nor a science, of arithmetic.”3 For Frege, this is the bad formalism, and it is 
characterized by the lack of the crucial distinction between signs and their contents, which 
should be definitely defeated in arithmetic —a science with its own content.
The ‘good formalism’ is exemplified in fact by Frege’s logicism, whereas the ‘bad for-
malism’ is one of the main enemies of logicism, i.e. mathematical formalism, especially those 
early versions of Heine and Thomae. In a footnote to Grundlagen Frege argues explicitly 
that his begriffsschrift is “designed to be capable of expressing not only the logical form, like 
Boole’s notation, but also the content of a proposition.”4 This content, which will be further 
split into sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung),5 is crucial to Frege; it is a sort of objective 
logical information that is ‘carried’ in the course of inferences of mathematical proofs, and 
that it should be kept pure in relations with intuitions, which are subjective and personal.
Thus, a begriffsschrift has a dual role: first, to prevent any infiltration of subjective intui-
tive elements into the proofs of the system, and second, to carry on objective semantic infor-
mation. The first role is secured by the logical deductive formalism of the system, whereas 
the second role is provided by his conception of the begriffsschrift as a characteristica univer-
salis and not just as Boole’s calculus racinator. It is worth noting that logicism (understood 
strictly as the thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic) can be made compatible with (the 
views of the nineteenth century) formalism. It is also worth noting that logicism (under-
stood strictly as the thesis that mathematics —or at least arithmetic— is reducible to logic) 
can be made compatible with intuitionism, if by ‘logic’ we mean an (sort of) intuitionistic 
acceptable logic.
The insoluble challenge is to try to make all three positions compatible at once. This 
does not work because of the inner tension between formalism and intuitionism. We could 
not consistently hold that mathematics is completely formal, i.e. totally contentless, and si-
multaneously maintain its intuitionistic character, namely that its content is based on pure 
intuitions. There is an insurmountable inner tension between the two which makes them 
mutually incompatible. So far, the moral is that logicism, as a pure thesis concerning the na-
ture of mathematics, is compatible with each formalism and intuitionism, yet not with both 
at once. However, Frege’s logicist project is basically at odds with formalism, for Frege’s 
logicism is not just characterized by the thesis that arithmetic is logic, but it comprises an-
other important aspect, namely the thesis that arithmetic is contentful. This fundamental 
claim is responsible for the persistent Fregean rejection of formalism. But could Frege’s logi-
cism be seen as being compatible with (a form of) intuitionism? Surprisingly, the straight 
2 By begriffsschrift I mean Frege’s logical system which has presented for the first time in his work 
B egriffsschrift. See Frege (1879).
3 Frege (1984, 114).
4 Gl §91; Frege (1884, 103).
5 See Frege (1892).
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answer is yes; as far as this form of intuitionism does not rely of subjective intuitions, I 
think that Frege’s logicism6 does not automatically reject it, and it could consequently be 
seen as compatible with a form of intuitionism.
2. Dehaene’s intutionism
Let us now tackle a form of modern mathematical intuitionism. Stanislas Dehaene’s intui-
tionism is based on his number sense assumption7 —the peculiar idea that we owe our math-
ematical intuitions to an inherited capacity which we share with other animals, namely, the 
rapid perception of approximate numbers of objects. But, first of all, why should we char-
acterize Dehaene’s position as intuitionistic? Basically, because he explicitly acknowledges 
this: “among the available theories on the nature of mathematics, intuitionism seems to 
me to provide the best account of the relations between arithmetic and the human brain.” 
(D ehaene 2011, 226)
What is particularly interesting to us here, in the context of Frege’s late philosophical 
ideas, is the fact that Dehaene does not characterize this intuition as subjective: “I believe 
that most mathematicians do not just manipulate symbols according to purely arbitrary 
rules. On the contrary, they try to capture in their theorems certain physical, numerical, ge-
ometrical, and logical intuitions.” (Dehaene 2011, 226)
Moreover, an important feature of mathematics is exactly this logical formalization of 
our common intuitions:
“Mathematics consists in the formalization and progressive refinement of our fundamental 
intuitions. As humans, we are born with multiple intuitions concerning numbers, sets, continu-
ous quantities, iteration, logic, and the geometry of space. Mathematicians strive to formalize 
these intuitions and turn them into logically coherent systems of axioms.” (Dehaene 2011, 228)
These intuitions are not subjective, for they are not personal. It is like we share a common 
stock of a priori intuitions which guide us and shape our arithmetical thinking; “to affirm 
that arithmetic is the product of the human mind does not imply that it is arbitrary and 
that, on some other planet, we might have been born with the idea that 1 + 1 = 3.” (De-
haene 2011, 231)
The crucial characteristic of these a priori intuitions is exactly the fact that they are not 
arbitrary. For Dehaene, we are born with a kind of arithmetical pre-settings, which shape 
our early mathematical knowledge: “Throughout phylogenetic evolution, as well as during 
cerebral development in childhood, selection has acted to ensure that the brain constructs 
internal representations that are adapted to the external world. Arithmetic is such an adap-
tation.” (Dehaene 2011, 231)
But what are these internal representations, and in which way could we eventually say 
that arithmetical cognition is grounded on geometrical representations? Dehaene is not 
6 For more about this possible compatibility between logicism and intuitionism, and the way in which 
Frege’s fight against formalism strongly motivated Frege’s puzzle and the introduction of his sense/ref-
erence distinction, see Costreie (2013).
7 Extensively presented in Dehaene (2011).
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very precise about what they are, yet the best supporting idea in this sense may be offered by 
his so-called Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes, or the SNARC effect, which 
shows us a robust link between the concept of number and space.
The SNARC Effect was presented and discussed for the first time in Dehaene et al. 
(1993), and it suggests that people represent numbers in the form of an imaginary number 
line. The experiment consists in asking (adult) subjects to classify numbers as smaller or 
larger than 65. To this end, they hold two response keys, one in the left hand and the other 
in the right hand. The result is that the subjects respond faster to large numbers with their 
right hand, and faster to small numbers with their left hand. Dehaene et al. claim that 
this must be because respondents are imaginarily place numbers on a number line, where 
smaller numbers are always to the left.
Based on these findings and on similar others, in his famous book The Number Sense, 
Dehaene developed an intuitionistic position regarding mathematics, while rejecting math-
ematical formalism:
“If mathematics is nothing more than a formal game, how is it that it focuses on specific and 
universal categories of the human mind such as numbers, sets, and continuous quantities? Why 
do mathematicians judge the laws of arithmetic to be more fundamental than the rules of chess?” 
(Dehaene 2011, 225)
Interestingly enough, Dehaene even resorts to the same example used by Frege himself in 
order to discuss and reject the formalist position,8 namely that of the parallelism between 
mathematics and chess. For Frege and Dehaene, adopting the formalist stance in math-
ematics, would transform and regard the whole of mathematics as a mere game of chess, 
which is for both preposterous; mathematics applies to the real world, whereas chess does 
not. Mathematical objects are neither invented following pure conventions, nor are they 
mere symbols manipulated according to arbitrary rules.
Dehaene explicitly argues along with Kant and Poincaré that
“[m]athematical objects are fundamental, a priori categories of human thought that the math-
ematician refines and formalizes. The structure of our mind forces us, in particular, to parse the 
world into discrete objects; this is the origin of our intuitive notions of set and of number. […] 
Among the available theories on the nature of mathematics, intuitionism seems to me to provide 
the best account of the relations between arithmetic and the human brain. The discoveries of the 
latest few years in the psychology of arithmetic have supplied new arguments to support the in-
tuitionist view that neither Kant nor Poincaré could have known. These empirical results tend to 
confirm Poincare’s postulate that number belongs to the “natural objects of thought,” the innate 
categories according to which we apprehend the world.” (Dehaene 2011, 226-7)
However, Dehaene does not endorse Brouwer’s version of intuitionism, for it makes the 
whole construction of mathematics too subjective and personal, which is also exactly the rea-
son why Frege rejected psychologism in mathematics. This form of subjective mental con-
structivism does not explain the objective applicability of mathematics onto the physical 
world, which is an essential Fregean characteristic for a contentful science as mathematics.
8 In Gg §§88-137, Frege is discussing in extenso exactly this example of Thomae that mathematics is no 
more than a game of chess. See Frege (1960).
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3. Frege’s late logicism or his intu-logicism9
Let us now go back to Frege on the relation between continuous and discrete quantities. 
Regarding that point, Frege argues in Numbers and Arithmetic that “numbers of differ-
ent kinds have arisen in different ways and must be distinguished accordingly” (Frege, 
1979, 276). For him, we have those kindergarten-numbers, which are basically discrete 
natural numbers, learned empirically —“drilled into children by parents and teachers.” 
He continues his characterization of kindergarten-numbers that
“[i]n this way something like images of numbers are formed in the child’s mind. But this is an arti-
ficial process which is imposed on the child rather than one which develops naturally within him. 
But even if it were a natural process, there would be hardly anything to learn about the real nature 
of the kindergarten numbers from the way they originate psychologically.” (Frege 1979, 276)
Here, the suggestion is clear: we may talk about a way in which we learn artificially and em-
pirically about discrete natural numbers, yet the epistemic origin and its cognitive founda-
tion is different, and it “develops naturally within him” on the basis of the apprehension 
of continuous magnitudes. This is so because, for Frege, the kindergarten numbers are “ex-
tremely limited in their application”, as they could not explain the conceptual construction 
and epistemic grasp of important categories in the realm of numbers, i.e. those of irrational 
numbers: “The labours of mathematicians have indeed led to another kinds of numbers, to 
the irrationals.” As he continues, the problem is that “there is no bridge which leads across 
from kindergarten-numbers to the irrationals.” (Frege 1979, 276)
Frege thus acknowledges his initial mistake, when he thought that he could build the 
whole of arithmetic on kindergarten numbers, i.e. natural numbers learned through educa-
tion, making associations between numbers and various suggestive representations of them:
I myself at one time held it to be possible to conquer the entire number domain, continuing 
along a purely logical path from the kindergarten numbers; I have seen the mistake in this. I was 
right in thinking that you cannot do this if you take an empirical route. (Frege 1979, 276)
The ‘empirical route’ was eventually refuted by Frege in Logic in Mathematics, for it could 
not deal with infinite numbers. There is no inner representation for them, so he concludes 
that the arithmetic “cannot be based on sense perception.” Thus it cannot be a posteriori: 
“So an a priori mode of cognition must be involved here. But this cognition does not have 
to flow from purely logical principles as I originally assumed. There is the further possibil-
ity that it has a geometrical source.” (Frege 1979, 227)
That may be seen as a substantial departure from his initial logicist stance, where arith-
metic and geometry were thought to have different epistemic foundations: “The more I 
have thought the matter over, the more convinced I have become that arithmetic and ge-
ometry have developed on the same basis —a geometrical one in fact— so that mathemat-
ics in its entirety is really geometry.” (Frege 1979, 227)
9 By ‘intu-logicism’ I understand an oxymoron formed by intuitionism and logicism, two prima facie in-
compatible positions, yet, as I have showed, this is a label for Frege’s later version of his logicist posi-
tion, where he made room for objective intuitions, as an a priori geometrical epistemic basis for arith-
metical cognition.
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However, the flaw of the original mistake was that he somehow associated all kinds of 
intuitions with subjective representations, leaving no room for any kind of objective repre-
sentations of mathematical numbers. At the end of his life, he realized the he had thrown 
out the baby with the bathwater. The “baby” is this a priori mode of cognition that has a 
geometrical source. Being a priori does not necessarily imply being subjective, and this was 
Frege’s initial mistake, which he corrected at the end of his life. This objective a priori mode 
of mathematical knowledge is nicely presented by Dehaene as well, and this is why I think 
his position is paradigmatic for a kind of intuitionism constructed on objective intuitions. 
This is crucial for Frege, for thus he may still defend the logicist project and apprehend the 
infinite through an objective a priori mode of cognition:
“From the geometrical source of knowledge flows the infinite in the genuine and strictest 
sense of this word. […] We have infinitely many points on every interval of a straight line. […] We 
cannot imagine the totality of these. […] One man may be able to imagine more, another less. But 
here we are not in the domain of psychology, of the imagination, of what is subjective, but in the 
domain of the objective, of what is true.” (Frege 1979, 273)
This is why for Frege geometry and philosophy, not just arithmetic and logic, are intimately 
intertwined: “it is here that geometry and philosophy come closest together. In fact they belong to 
one another. A philosopher who has nothing to do with geometry is only half a philosopher, and 
a mathematician with no element of philosophy in him is only half a mathematician. These disci-
plines have estranged themselves from one another to the detriment of both.” (Frege 1979, 273)
It is this geometrical source of knowledge, both a priori and objective, which offers us the 
foundation for any further mathematical knowledge, we may thus conceptually grasp infin-
ity, which is otherwise left outside sensorial perception: “it is evident that sense perception 
can yield nothing infinite. However many stars we may include in our inventories, there 
will never be infinitely many. […] For this we need a special source of knowledge, and one 
such is the geometrical.” (Frege 1979, 274).
4. The role of geometrical knowledge in arithmetical cognition
Turning back to Dehaene, there are passages in his The Number Sense that sound strikingly 
similar to Frege’s later position:
“The foundations of any mathematical construction are grounded on fundamental intuitions 
such as notions of set, number, space, time, or logic. These are almost never questioned, so deeply 
do they belong to the irreducible representations concocted by our brain. Mathematics can be 
characterized as the progressive formalization of these intuitions. Its purpose is to make them 
more coherent, mutually compatible, and better adapted to our experience of the external world.” 
(Dehaene 2011, 228)
Moreover, yet rather unsurprisingly, Dehaene, exactly like Frege, places himself further 
somehow in between Platonism and intuitionism:
“The hypothesis of a partial adaptation of mathematical theories to the regularities of the 
physical world can perhaps provide some grounds for a reconciliation between Platonists and in-
tuitionists. Platonism hits upon an undeniable element of truth when it stresses that physical re-
ality is organized according to structures that predate the human mind. […] Numbers, like other 
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mathematical objects, are mental constructions whose roots are to be found in the adaptation of 
the human brain to the regularities of the universe.” (Dehaene 2011, 233)
The apparent conclusion of both Frege and Dehaene may be thus clearly stated —as this 
‘concreteness’ of mathematical cognition in relation with the real world: “When we think 
about numbers, or do arithmetic, we do not rely solely on a purified, ethereal, abstract con-
cept of number. Our brain immediately links the abstract number to concrete notions of 
size, location and time. We do not do arithmetic “in the abstract.”’ (Dehaene 2011, 246)
The moral so far is that it seems that both Frege and Dehaene claim that there should 
be a kind of geometrical epistemic basis of the knowledge of numbers. This idea is endorsed 
by Dehaene’s intuitionism, which holds that arithmetical cognition is based on and evolves 
from a kind of objective geometrical a priori knowledge. Let us recall the SNARC effect. 
This result is of key importance for the current issue of the spatial coding of numbers. It 
demonstrates that numerical magnitude information is spatially encoded. Further experi-
ments conducted in this direction endorse this hypothesis and indicate that:
ii(i) The experiment works for negative numbers as well.10
i(ii) The direction of the line is culturally dependent.11
(iii) Its origin is of a conceptual rather than visuospatial nature.12
What is important here is to see that we commonly order numbers along an imaginary line, 
which suggests that in order to mentally process numbers, we need to previously arrange 
them in a line. This suggests the existence of an interesting fact concerning mathematical 
cognition, namely that we first epistemically assimilate continuous lines, and only after-
wards identify discrete points (on them).
What other contemporary findings support these ideas? Further evidence may come from 
studies concerning Gerstmann’s syndrome.13 These impairments might obstruct the use of 
writing multi-digit numerals and forming visual images of them (as well as of a number line), 
thereby preventing mental calculation using the place system of numerals. It looks like due 
to a physical impairment of the brain, which basically affects our capacity to ‘visualize lines’, 
we could not rightly process any more numbers.14 This strongly suggests that the two types of 
mathematical knowledge, which have traditionally been regarded as different —arithmetical 
and geometrical— may be underpinned by the same epistemic a priori basis which, in fact, en-
dorses all mathematical knowledge, and which may be characterized as being ‘geometrical’ in 
nature. All these ideas are now endorsed by recent findings in the field of neurosciences:
“[n]euroimaging has confirmed and greatly elaborated the findings from neurological pa-
tients. It suggests that the IPS (intraparietal sulcus) is the locus of core numerical processing. […] 
The IPS and surrounding regions also respond to tasks in which magnitudes such as time, size and 
velocity are analyzed, and it has been suggested that numerical information emerges from a gener-
alized magnitude system.” (B utterworth & Walsh 2011, 619)
10 Shaki & Petrusic (2005).
11 Zebian (2005).
12 Fias & van Dijk & Gevers (2011).
13 In 1940, a German neurologist, Josef Gerstmann, showed that a lesion of the left inferior parietal re-
gion can cause a tetrad of deficits: dyscalculia, finger agnosia, dysgraphia, and left-right confusion. For 
more, see Gerstmann (1940).
14 For more, see Dehaene & Cohen (1997).
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Many numerate people, approximately 15%, form a mental image of the sequence of num-
bers, called by Sir Francis Galton number forms,15 where the sequence is represented in two 
dimensions. Number forms are described by D ehaene (2011) as follows:
Number forms can be likened to a conscious and enriched version of the mental number line 
that we all share. While most people’s mental number line is apparent only in subtle reaction time 
experiments, number forms are readily available to awareness and are also richer in visual details, 
such as color or a precise orientation in space.” (Dehaene 2011, 73)
Moreover, for some people, numbers are not only mentally placed on an imaginary line, but 
they are colored and are placed in specific spatial locations:
“[t]hough a majority of people have an unconscious mental number line oriented from left to right, 
some have a much more vivid image of numbers. Between 5% and 10% of humanity is thoroughly 
convinced that numbers have colors and occupy very precise locations in space.” (Dehaene 2011, 71)
Thus it seems that there are some a priori pre-settings of our mind, which help us deal with 
the concepts of space and time, and which consists of a kind of prerequisites for all kind of 
mathematical knowledge.
I would like to conclude with Einstein’s description of his inner thinking creative proc-
esses, which is also cited by Dehaene (2011), in order to exemplify the role of language and 
intuitions in mathematics:
“Words and language, whether written or spoken, do not seem to play any part in my thought 
processes. The psychological entities that serve as building blocks for my thought are certain signs 
or images, more or less clear, that I can reproduce and recombine at will.” (Dehaene 2011, 136)
Summing up, we have tried so far to see in what way Frege’s later logicism may be compat-
ible with a form of mathematical intuitionism, and one of the most suitable candidates on 
the market seems to be Dehaene’s intuitionism. Both share the idea that arithmetical think-
ing has a geometrical epistemic source, which is equally objective and a priori. This is an in-
teresting result which is endorsed by many contemporary studies and findings in the area of 
arithmetical cognition, and which eventually shows that arithmetical knowledge is devel-
oped ultimately on a geometrical epistemic foundation.
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